Sunday, August 28, 2005

How to Win in Iraq

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. wrote How to Win in Iraq Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade

Gee, so rather than trying to kill insurgents, we should become bodyguards for the next ten years. That makes sense. NOT!!!
.... On the political front, they have been working to create a democratic Iraq, but that is a goal, not a strategy.
A pretty good goal, if you ask me
On the military front, they have sought to train Iraqi security forces and turn the war over to them. As President George W. Bush has stated, "Our strategy can be summed up this way: as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." But the president is describing a withdrawal plan rather than a strategy
With the Left pushing for withdrawal now, I certainly prefer GWB's version.
.... according to the most recent polls, nearly two-thirds think the coalition is "bogged down."
They said the same thing during the sandstorm a few days into the Iraq War. When the sandstorm was over our forces moved into Baghdad much faster than any other army ever did.
... The administration's critics, meanwhile, have offered as their alternative "strategy" an accelerated timetable for withdrawal. They see Iraq as another Vietnam and advocate a similar solution: pulling out U.S. troops and hoping for the best. The costs of such premature disengagement would likely be calamitous. The insurgency could morph into a bloody civil war, with the significant involvement of both Syria and Iran. Radical Islamists would see the U.S. departure as a victory, and the ensuing chaos would drive up oil prices.
All true, but then they could blame GWB for it all.
Instead of a timetable for withdrawal, the United States needs a real strategy built around the principles of counterinsurgency warfare. To date, U.S. forces in Iraq have largely concentrated their efforts on hunting down and killing insurgents. The idea of such operations is to erode the enemy's strength by killing fighters more quickly than replacements can be recruited.
Somehow I dont think not killing them is going to make them go away.
Although it is too early to tell for sure whether this approach will ultimately bring success, its current record is not good: even when an attack manages to inflict serious insurgent casualties, there is little or no enduring improvement in security once U.S. forces withdraw from the area.

Instead, U.S. and Iraqi forces should adopt an "oil-spot strategy" in Iraq, which is essentially the opposite approach. Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need.
How much support do you think they have now, since most of the people they are killing are Iraqis.
Since the U.S. and Iraqi armies cannot guarantee security to all of Iraq simultaneously, they should start by focusing on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort -- hence the image of an expanding oil spot.
Things are very safe in most Kurdish areas, and in a lot of the Shi'ite areas. Sounds like we are doing just what he suggests.
Such a strategy would have a good chance of success. But it would require a protracted commitment of U.S. resources, a willingness to risk more casualties in the short term, and an enduring U.S. presence in Iraq, albeit at far lower force levels than are engaged at present. If U.S. policymakers and the American public are unwilling to make such a commitment, they should be prepared to scale down their goals in Iraq significantly.
What is a scaled down version of democracy?

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