What Extremists Are Saying

Centcom said We note seven critical themes from the Zawahiri-Zarqawi letter. The first four confirm al-Qaida’s long-term strategy and core beliefs; the latter three reflect new information about how senior al-Qaida leader Zawahiri views developments in Iraq – and elsewhere – turning against them.

• Iraq is becoming the central battlefield for al-Qaida senior leaders in Pakistan. Zawahiri views Iraq as the bridgehead for the creation of a new Islamic caliphate – their ultimate objective.

  That is their short-term ultimate objective. Long term they want a world wide Islamic caliphate.

  The letter makes clear al-Qa'ida intends to wrest control of Iraq from the Iraqi people so they can use the country in pursuit of other goals.
• Al-Qaida’s ambitions do not stop at Iraq’s borders. Establishing the political dominance of Sunni militants in Iraq is only a first step—a means to an end—in realizing al-Qaida’s ambitions of imposing its control over the broader Middle East. In fact, al-Qaida’s focus on Iraq has nothing to do with Iraqi nationalism, but is purely instrumental as a beachhead for al-Qaida’s broader agenda. Under al-Qaida, Iraq will serve as a terrorist haven and staging ground for attacks against Iraq’s neighbors and quite possibly Western nations -- all those judged to be ruling in violation of their distorted interpretation of Islamic law – and clearly destabilize the region.
• The letter demonstrates that pulling US forces out of Iraq is the wrong approach – that terrorists will not simply lay down their arms when American forces depart Iraq.

  Tell this to the weak willed Dems.

  Al-Qaida and its terrorist brethren will not go away when the Coalition hands over security control to Iraqi forces; rather, they are committed to overthrowing the elected, democratic Iraqi government and ruling the country according to their interpretation of Islamic law.
• Zawahiri believes in religious intolerance and converting, conquering, or killing anyone who does not believe as he does. His only concern is how to deceive the population that this is not the case by urging Zarqawi to reduce attacks on Shia civilians.

  Both want the Shia dead. Zarqawi wants them to die in a civil war now, Zawahiri wants to wait until he controls the country.

  Zawahiri contends that Shia are heretics. He views Shi’ism as a “religious school based on excess and falsehood,” and as a danger to what he sees as true, Sunni Islam. Zawahiri does not condemn Zarqawi for killing Shia. Indeed, the Shia, along with anyone who does not blindly follow al-Qaida’s twisted interpretation of Islam, will be forced either to adopt al-Qa'ida's extremist ideology or face repression or death if the terrorists establish control. Zawahiri’s concerns are purely tactical; managing the press and gaining the support, or acquiescence, of the people.
• Zawahiri clearly is worried they are losing public support in Iraq, and is attuned to the role of the media in the battle for such support. Zawahiri emphasizes that the struggle is ideological, with each side competing for the popular support and loyalty of the Muslim world. Zarqawi’s methods are backfiring by alienating the Iraqi people with attacks against the Shia.
• Zawahiri, who previously termed democracy heretical, is willing to exploit the political process unfolding in Iraq to advance the group’s goals. Zawahiri is advocating a modified strategy in an attempt to expand the group’s Sunni support base in Iraq. It is tacit acknowledgement that the political process unfolding in Iraq appeals to average Iraqis. Zarqawi’s recent pronouncements for all-out war against the Shia and recent rhetoric against Sunnis supporting the government and coalition stirred concerns among his advisers and allies and already have prompted Zarqawi to quickly adjust his rhetoric and some tactics.
• Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi reveals continued points of weakness in Pakistan-based al-Qaida senior leaders and what they need to operate and survive:
  • Financial shortages: Zawahiri asks for a payment of approximately 100,000 of an unspecified currency until “new lines” – likely with donors – are opened.

    It is difficult to keep his hosts bribed to keep him and Osama safe when each has a $25 million bounty on their heads.

    Moreover, he makes this request in the context of Abu Faraj al-Libi, intimating that his capture adversely affected al-Qaida’s ability to transfer funds.
  • The CT efforts of our partners: Furthermore, Zawahiri notes that while they may have limited the consequences of Abu Faraj’s capture, al-Qaida is wary of the Pakistani army’s presence in the tribal areas where its leaders have found sanctuary. This highlights the importance of continued Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror.

    And shows how smart Bush was to establish good relations with the Pakistanis. Not only has he brought them and India to a point where they are willing to talk peace, rather than nuclear war, but they are also helping round up Al Qaeda.

    As partnerships and partnership capacity expands, so shrinks the space in which terrorists can operate.
  • Isolation of senior leadership. Zawahiri appeals to Zarqawi for information about the situation and activities in Iraq.

Caos blogged Zawahiri, who previously termed democracy heretical, is willing to exploit the political process unfolding in Iraq to advance the group’s goals. Zawahiri is advocating a modified strategy in an attempt to expand the group’s Sunni support base in Iraq . It is tacit acknowledgement that the political process unfolding in Iraq appeals to average Iraqis. Zarqawi’s recent pronouncements for all-out war against the Shia and recent rhetoric against Sunnis supporting the government and coalition stirred concerns among his advisers and allies and already have prompted Zarqawi to quickly adjust his rhetoric and some tactics.

HE!D! blogged If You Didn’t Think Iraq Was Crucial Before…You’re An Irredeemable Idiot

Chad Evans blogged The overall tone of the letter is one of desperation and isolation. Zawahiri continually states he does not know the full picture of Zarqawi in Iraq, but he also continually chides Zarqawi’s tactics for not gaining more popular support in Iraq. Each letter that has been found in Iraq or elsewhere demonstrates Al Qaida in Iraq is on the verge of collapse. The question is how long will it take and are there other capable people other than Zarqawi leading the group that are keeping it together. Sadly, it appears so.

commissar blogged I received the following from CENTCOM. Normally, I wouldn’t post a government press release verbatim. This merits an exception. The money quote: “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our nation.”

Wizbang blogged Everyone and their cousin has commented on the latest intercepted Al Qaeda letter, from Zawahiri to Zarqawi. I started on my own analysis of it, but discovered that everything I had thought about it had already been written by others. But, by far, the best I've seen so far was by CITIZEN SMASH, a Naval Reservist who spent a good chunk of time over in Iraq on active duty.

Smash blogged Zawahiri urges Zarqawi to get involved in the political process. In other words, it's time to start making deals to share power with the apostates and infidels. Zawahiri can read the writing on the wall. But will Zarqawi get the message?

Jeff Goldstein blogged I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our nation

OTB blogged Zawahiri is very worried that Zarqawi is going to blow the whole Iraq deal because he's a loose cannon.

Juan Cole questions the authenticity of the letter, saying before he went to Pakistan he had never, ever heard a Sunni Muslim add "wa alihi" (and his family) to the salutation, and speculates an Egyptian would not use the phrase. But supposedly Ben Laden and al-Zawahiri have been in the area between Paksitan and Afganistan, and maybe he picked up some traits of the way they speak.